Research

Urban expansion drives biodiversity loss and increases travel costs without effectively boosting housing production, necessitating land use policies that limit development. Simultaneously, land-related tax revenues constitute a significant portion of municipal budgets, creating potential incentives for local authorities to develop land precisely when land value increases: a taxing dilemma between preserving soils and raising municipal revenues. Using a panel database of France's main land-related taxes and exploiting quasi-experimental variation in toxic loan exposure, we analyse how financial constraints affect land take. Results reveal nuanced responses: only municipalities severely affected by the debt shock exhibit an increase in land take. This effect primarily reflects commercial rather than residential development, accompanied by reduced densification. Municipalities strategically adjust fiscal policy by moderately increasing property taxes (their highest revenue-generating instrument). Responses vary by context: urban municipalities rely more on tax adjustments, while rural areas show greater land use flexibility. Under fiscal competition where policy options are constrained, land take increases substantially, highlighting environmental risks. These findings challenge the presumed tradeoff between local fiscal revenues and land conservation, suggesting that financial constraints typically promote restrained land use except under severe fiscal stress with limited alternatives. This demonstrates the necessity of considering tax system complexity regarding both incentives and environmental impact when designing policy.

Land-use decisions involve competing actors whose conflicts are difficult to observe yet can shape development beyond formal regulation. This paper analyzes over two decades of construction- and land-use–related litigation in France, using large language models to extract evidence from more than 230,000 administrative court decisions. Five stylized facts emerge. First, litigation is mainly initiated by private individuals opposing authorized housing or regulatory changes that threaten their own development rights. Second, environmental amenity preservation is another major driver, with growing litigation against urban planning documents. Third, litigation against construction is highly concentrated in dense and tourist areas, while challenges to regulation are more widespread and increasing nationwide. Fourth, construction litigation is determined by local economic incentives, housing prices being the main explanatory variable. It can affect a substantial share of new housing and is linked to longer construction delays. Finally, planning documents are increasingly contested both to limit land consumption and to protect individual building rights, highlighting rising difficulties in land-use planning. Overall, litigation is frequent and represents significant friction, while success rates in courts are low, suggesting inefficiencies and potential scope for negotiation.

In France, land take disproportionately affects agricultural land, with land prices surging up to 65 times upon reclassification as buildable. This process not only threatens biodiversity but also exacerbates socio-economic inequalities, as wealth disparities increasingly limit access to homeownership, especially for younger generations. This research project investigates the relationship between land tenure inequalities and artificialization, focusing on the distribution of ownership and the beneficiaries of associated land rents. By constructing a comprehensive national database of real estate property, including socio-economic characteristics of owners, we analyze ownership concentration before and after land take.